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I.

PLEADING

A. Demurrer

1. Construction of Pleading.-Where the plaintiffs bill of complaint
for specific performance of a contract for the purchase of a specified
parcel of realty discloses on its face that the agreement was oral, the
defendant may raise the defense of the statute of frauds by demurrer.'
1. Fortner v. Wilkinson, 357 S.W.2d 63 (Ten. 1962).
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The allegations of the facts of defendant's conduct in an occurrence
or event resulting in harm to plaintiff's property caused by a collision
of motor vehicles are not affected by adding an averment that this
conduct was wantonly or grossly negligent. The conclusion of a
pleader2 from matters properly pleaded in detail is usually disregarded.
Yet where the defect is one that could have been reached by
demurrer or motion and the opponent goes to trial without objection
or pleads a special plea which presents for trial the indefinitely
pleaded matter, the defect is cured by verdict or judgment
in favor of
3
the party whose pleading was originally defective.
In Ward v. University of the South,4 an action to recover damages
for wrongful death, the complaint alleged that the university and
three of its officials were negligent in not preventing a named student
from having in his university dormitory room a firearm, contrary to
the regulations of the university, and in not taking precautions to
prevent students from purchasing firearms from one Baker, a seller of
firearms, and that Baker was guilty of negligence per se in selling
the particular firearm to the student. In one count it alleged that the
negligence of the university and its officials was the proximate cause
of the death of plaintiffs intestate caused by the negligent handling of
the pistol by the student purchaser, and in a second count alleged
that the negligence of Baker was the proximate cause. Each defendant demurred separately on several grounds. The demurrers for
misjoinder of parties were sustained because each party acted independently, and the two counts were repugnant and irreconcilable,
The demurrer of the university for failure to state a cause was sustained; it was held not responsible for the purchaser-student's act in
violating the university regulations. Incidentally, the appellant failed
to file an assignment of errors in his statement and brief, which
covered 184 typewritten pages, and did attach exhibits which were
not part of the pleadings. This case is another illustration of the
liberality of the court in excusing violations of its own rules which
would justify dismissal of the appeal but do not necessarily preclude
consideration of the substantive problems involved.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-910 provides that a demurrer
shall state the objection relied upon. In his complaint in chancery,
a taxpayer asked recovery of amounts paid by him under protest. The
respondent's demurrer- set .forth as his grounds that there are no
equities which would entitle the complainant to recover interest or
penalties paid under "protest -as a result of deficiencies under the
2. Fontaine v. Mason-Dixon Freight Lines, 357 S.W.2d 61, (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
3. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Lyle, 351 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
4. 354 S.W.2d 246 (Tenn. 1962).
- .
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Sales and Use Tax Law. The chancellor overruled the demurrer and
allowed a discretionary appeal. The supreme court affirmed for the
reason that the grounds stated in the demurrer were too broad and
general to satisfy the requirements of the code provision.5
(a) Res Ipsa Loquitur.-Where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is applicable, the fact that the plaintiff has pleaded that specified
relevant conduct of defendant was negligent does not overcome the
effect of the doctrine; the generalization that specific allegations overcome or limit the general is disregarded. 6 There is conflict in the
decisions on this subject. Statements in the opinions set forth some
four different views, some of them going so far as to declare that by
pleading specific negligence, the pleader abandons all reliance upon
the doctrine. It is submitted that no satisfactory reason has been
given for any such limitation, particularly if the facts stated constitute
the basis for a logically justifiable inference of negligence.
(b) Nil Debet.-Though Tennessee Code Annotated section 21-613
requires that an answer contain a clear and orderly statement of facts
on which the defense is founded, a plea of nil debet interposed to a
claim for reimbursement of money paid on a judgment by complainant
is not a nullity and cannot be the basis of a decree pro confesso in
favor of complainant.8
II.

BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

The current decisions do little to clear up the confusion caused by
the use of the term presumption, though it is usually not too difficult
to determine the effect intended to be given it in a particular case.
In Wofford v. State,9 for example, the court said that possession of
a forged instrument by a defendant claiming an interest in it raised
"aconclusive presumption that the possessor forged it or caused it to
be forged" but immediately added that the defendant's testimony
that it came to him in the mails in its present condition made his
guilt a question for the jury. Thus, its effect was merely to put on
the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. And in Cutshaw v. Randles,0 the
court held that the statutory presumption of code sections 59-820 to
-859, from registration and proof of agency vanishes on the introduction of evidence tending to prove the non-existence of the presumed
fact. This is probably a statement of the Thayer theory. And a
5. Blue Circle of Knoxville, Inc. v. Butler, 354 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn. 1962).
6. Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 355 S.W.2d 436 (Tenn. 1962).
7. See Pnossm, TORTS §§ 42, 43, at 199, 214 (2d ed. 1955).
8. Harris v. Naff, 360 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. 1962).
9. 358 S.W.2d 302 (Tenn. 1962).
10. 357 S.W.2d 628 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
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person questioning the good faith of a public official in the performance of his official functions is met with a presumption to the contrary. Thus the official action of a board of education of the county
in passing upon appointments and assignments of positions is presumed to have been taken in good faith."
In stating that the ownership of a building raises a presumption of
occupancy by the owner even where there is some evidence that
occupancy may be by others, the court seems to have meant that the
presumption did not lose all force by reason of the reception of this
evidence. Something more was required, but just what is left uncertain. It may mean that in the circumstances ownership would
justify a finding of occupancy.' 2
The constantly repeated statement that killing with a dangerous
weapon raises a presumption of malice seems to mean that such a
killing is the basis for an inference and the basic fact of a presumption.
The receipt of evidence tending to prove lack of malice-accident or
self defense-makes the question one for the jury.1"
Hogue v. Kroger Co.14 is an illustration of the bad policy of drafting
a statute with such terms as prima facie evidence and its use by the
court as the equivalent of presumption which has to be overcome by
evidence. The question, raised in an action in equity to restrain a sale
at a price below the allowable statutory minimum, turned on whether
the value of trading stamps given by competitors was to be counted in
determining the allowable minimum price and its effect as a basis for a
finding of unlawful intent.
III. JUDICIAL NoTIcE

The cases in which the Tennessee courts have applied the doctrine
of judicial notice present no novel situations. In determining that a
demand for a jury trial was timely, the court noticed that all public
buildings and public offices are usually closed on Labor Day; this
includes the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court. 1 5 It also needed
no evidence to find that Huntingdon is less than 35 miles from Jackson
and that sunset at Huntingdon was not later in that city than in
Jackson on December 4, 1959. This was important in a trial involving
a collision with an unlighted bicycle at 5:15 P.M. on that date. 6
Concerning matters of law, it is no longer doubted that United
11. Mayes v. Bailey, 352 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. 1961).
12. Evans v. State, 354 S.W.2d 263 (Tenn. 1962).
13. Cooper v . State, 356 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1962); Neely v. State, 356 S.W.2d
401 (Tenn. 1962).
14. 356 S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. 1962).
15. Arp v. Wolfe, 354 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
16. Chandler v. Nolen, 359 S.W.2d 591 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
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States statutes are subjects of judicial notice. They need not be introduced into evidence, and they may properly be referred to by the
trial judge in his charge to the jury. 17 But the Supreme Court of
Tennessee will not take judicial notice of the rules of any other court
in this state. Hence, unless the rules, if any, of a circuit court specifying the time in which a notice for a new trial must be made after
verdict or decree are proved and incorporated in the bill of exceptions
or are found in the minutes of the court, the supreme court will not
entertain a motion to strike a motion for a new trial on the ground
that it was not timely made. Such a motion itself will be stricken. 18
But the supreme court in a disbarment proceeding will take judicial
notice of prior proceedings impeaching a judge in the Senate and
may use the findings of the Senate in determining whether the judge
should be disbarred. 19
IV. EVIDENCE
A. Relevance
1. Reputation.-In Chaffin v. State20 defendant and decedent were
parties to a boundary dispute. In an encounter between the two,
defendant killed decedent; defendant relied on self-defense. Evidence
was received of the reputation of decedent as a man of violence and
of threats by him against defendant which had been communicated
to defendant. Defendant testified that he knew decedent carried a
pistol. He offered also to prove threats by decedent against others,
including adjoining land owners, and decedent's reputation for carrying a pistol, and his disputes with others. The offer was rejected unless defendant was connected with these disputes. After conviction
of voluntary manslaughter, defendant appealed. In affirming, the
supreme court held the offered evidence inadmissible under the accepted rule that evidence of specific acts tendered to show the actor's
disposition to be used as a basis for inferring his guilt of an offense
charged is inadmissible for reasons of extrinsic policy.
B. Hearsay
1. Opinion.-A certificate of a physician as to the physical and
mental condition of a patient, which is made as a private record for
the patient's attorney and was never filed in any court in any prior
proceeding, was and is hearsay-and is inadmissible. In a long review
17. Rush v. Lick Creek Watershed Dist., 359 S.W.2d 582 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
18. Shettles v. State, 352 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1961).
19. Schoolfield v. Tennessee Bar Ass'n, 209 Tenn. 304, 353 S.W.2d 401 (1961).
20. 354 S.W.2d 772 (Tenn. 1962).

- ,
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of the voluminous record in a carelessly tried case showing misconduct of both counsel, the court indicated that many of the rulings, if
erroneous, were harmless and upheld the ruling on the inadmissibility
of opinion evidence. Such a case puts an undue burden upon the
court below. Except as a guide to the trial court on a new trial, it
seems to serve no purpose justifying its publication. 2 ' It is full of
statements of settled rules such as those governing the requisites for
the direction of a verdict.
Where on cross-examination a party introduced evidence of the
opinion of the witness as to the testator's condition on the date of
his execution of the codicil of a will, he is precluded from objection
to its admissibility. The fact that the direct examination made no
reference to testator's condition on that date may affect the scope of
cross-examination permitted over objection, but it has no bearing
upon the right to have the admitted evidence considered by the trier.22
And a lay witness who has described the physical appearance of the
testator and the stated circumstances from personal observation over
a long period of time is competent to testify as to his opinion of the
testator's unsoundness of mind. If he does so in an answer responsive
to a question, the answer will not be stricken because contrary to
what counsel expected2 3
2. Spontaneous Statement Exception.-In King v. State,2 a prosecution for rape, the trial court admitted evidence of declarations of the
prosecutrix made (1) to a neighbor about two hours after the event,
(2) to police officers within five hours, and (3) to her husband the
next morning. In affirming the conviction the supreme court pointed
out that the prosecutrix had testified and seemed to emphasize the
fact that the former statements were "confirmatory of her credibility."
There are several theories on which evidence of fresh complaint in
rape has been held admissible. If the complaint was made while she
was still suffering from nervous shock caused by the attack, the
evidence is admissible for the truth of the matter asserted as an
exception to the hearsay rule, whether she has or has not testified.
If she has not testified, it still may be admitted also on the ground
of anticipatory rehabilitation of an apparent self-contradiction involved in lack of complaint. If she has testified, the evidence is still
admissible for the truth of the complaint, since the spontaneous
statement exception to the hearsay rule does not require a showing
of unavailability of the declarant. If she has been impeached, the
evidence is still admissible for both purposes. The subject is fully
21. Schlickling v. Georgia Conference Ass'n Seventh-Day Adventists, 49 Tenn. App.

412, 355 S.W.2d 469 (W.S. 1961).
22. Arp v. Wolfe, 354 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. App. E.S.

23. Ibid.
24. 357 S.W.2d 42 (Tenn. 1962).

1956).
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treated by Wigmore.2
3. Assertion of Agency.-An assertion by a declarant that he was the
agent or servant of defendant in a specified activity is, standing alone,
inadmissible hearsay, but when there is evidence tending to prove the
asserted relationship, entirely independent of this assertion, evidence
of the assertion is admissible. It is often said to be receivable because
in corroboration of the other evidence. In the instant case the court
found no such other evidence but found contrary uncontradicted
evidence, so that the trial judge should have directed a verdict for
defendant. The person causing the alleged injury to plaintiff's property, a truck driver, was not then acting as an agent or servant of the
defendant.2
4. Photographs.-Still photographs of a relevant place may be received in evidence if a competent witness testifies that they fairly
represent the appearance of that place as it was at a specified time.27
A similar rule applies to maps, diagrams and models. The courts are
generally liberal in dealing with matters of this sort, and very few
practitioners need to be told of the dangers of misrepresentation by
the use of lighting, the angle and height at which the camera is set,
and misuse of the film.
5. ParolEvidence Rule.-Where a promissory note payable in weekly instalments with interest on the unpaid balance is usurious on its
face, parol evidence is not admissible to show that the word "interest"
was meant to include interest and other charges so as to make the
note valid and enforceable.2
V. JURISDICrION AND VENUE

A. Over Subject Matter-Commencement of Action
At the request of plaintiff's attorney, the clerk of the court drafted
a summons; pursuant to his instructions the clerk did nothing further.
He put the summons in "the safe"; later the defendant's attorney
procured it from the clerk and took it to his office for the purpose of
having copies made to send to his clients. Thereafter, on December
7, 1960, plaintiff filed his declaration with the clerk; on that date the
summons and declaration were delivered to a deputy sheriff for
service and were served. This was more than 13 months after plaintiff was injured. The supreme court, reversing the court of appeals,
held that the action had not been commenced within the time limited
25. WiGMoRx, EvmENcE §§ 1134-40 (3d ed. 1940).
26. Heywood Feed Ingredients, Inc. v. State, 356 S.W.2d 605 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1961).
27. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Lyle, 351 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).

28. Rush v. Chattanooga DuPont Employees' Credit Union, 358 S.W.2d 333 (Tenn.
1962).
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by the statute. That the plaintiff acted in good faith was immaterial.
The court had not acquired jurisdiction of the cause.29
The amended motor vehicle statute, section 20-224 of the code,
provides that the secretary of state is the agent to accept service of
process for a non-resident motorist in any civil action for injury or
damage caused by the motorist's operation of a vehicle on the highways of this state. The duration of the agency is for one year and
such further period as may be necessary to enable the secretary to
complete the service if the process is sued out prior to the expiration
of the year and forwarded to him with reasonable dispatch. The injury in the case at bar occurred October 8, 1960; summons was issued
and complaint filed October 5, 1961, and forwarded to the secretary.
It reached him eight days after the end of the year. The trial judge
ruled that the secretary's agency had expired and dismissed the
action; the supreme court reversed. It pointed out that the amendment had been enacted to overcome the result reached in earlier
cases construing the statute as prescribing a mandatory condition of
the right of action rather than as a statute of limitations.30
The Criminal Court of Hamblin County had jurisdiction to try a 15year-old boy on the charge of rape. When he was found not guilty
of rape, it was held to have no power to consider the charge of the
lesser included offense of assault with intent to know carnally a female
under the age of twelve years. It must remand the case to the juvenile
31
court.

A statute authorizing service of process upon a corporation in a
place in which an agency or office of the corporation is located is
applicable as of the time service is made. It is immaterial that the
location is only temporary and not intended to be maintained permanently. The numerous activities of the corporation reduced the
question to one of venue only under the applicable venue statute. 2
The Court of General Sessions of Sullivan County is a court of inferior jurisdiction and has no legal power to decree forfeiture of office
of an elected official, and in so far as it adjudged ouster from office, its
judgment was void and of no legal effect.3
Plaintiff brought action to set aside her deceased husband's Nevada
divorce decree and to be appointed to administer his estate and to
receive the widow's pension from the Veterans' Administration. She
set forth in detail statements as to her marriage to him, their living
together for nine years and his absence for 23 years without tidings,
and his securing the divorce by false representations; there is no
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Robertson v. Giant Food Mkt., Inc., 358 S.W.2d 338 (Tenn. 1962).
Anderson v. Outland, 360 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. 1962).
Greene v. State, 358 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 1962).
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Ortiz, 361 S.W.2d 113 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
Sams v. State, 356 S.W.2d 273 (Tenn. 1962).
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averment that the husband ever owned any property in Tennessee.
The defendant, the second wife, pleaded in abatement that she was a
non-resident of Tennessee and a resident of Los Angeles, California,
that attempted service of process was made only by publication, and
that the divorce was granted in a named judicial district court in
Nevada. The court held the plea in abatement effective. There was
no basis for its exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant or for
jurisdiction over property.3
A private act, section 2-1902 of the code, provides that in an election contest the Law Court of Ducktown and the Circuit Court of
Polk County have concurrent jurisdiction, except that when one material defendant resides within the Ducktown district, the Law Court
of Ducktown has exclusive jurisdiction. In an action in which such
Ducktown residents were among the defendants, but were dismissed
as parties before trial, the jurisdiction of the Ducktown court was no
longer exclusive.3
VI. TRIAL
A. Jury
1. Right to Trial by Jury.-The respondent in a disbarment proceeding is not entitled to trial by jury.36
2. Eligibility of Jurors-Voir Dire Examination.-Where a juror on
voir dire answered "yes" to the question whether she was acquainted
with the opposing party's attorney, she was under no duty to disclose
that she was a member of a Sunday School class taught by the attorney. She was not thereby disqualified nor was she shown to have
been prejudiced in his favor. On appeal the court begins with a presumption in favor of regularity and fairness of the trial and of the
37
validity of the judgment.
3. Instructions.-The former uncertainty as to the right or duty to
poll the jury is now regulated by statute.m The judge is under no duty
to poll unless requested to do so by the prosecution or defense. It is
salutary practice for the judge to repeat the charge approved in
Rogers v. State,39 "the court is the proper source from which you are
to get the law. In other words, you are judges of the law as well as
the facts under the direction of the court."40
It goes without saying that a requested instruction inapplicable
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Graham v. Graham, 352 S.W.2d 445 (Tenn. 1961).
Dixon v. McClary, 349 S.W.2d 140 (Tenn. 1961).
Schoolfield v. Tennessee Bar Ass'n, 209 Tenn. 304, 353 S.W.2d 401 (1961).
Sears v. Lewis, 357 S.W.2d 839 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
T NN. CoDE: ANN. §§ 20-1324, -1325 (1956).
196 Tenn. 263, 265, 265 S.W.2d 559 (1954).
Hardin v. State, 355 S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1962).
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under the evidence which has been received should not be given.
Thus, where defendant was on trial under an indictment for grand
larceny and there was no evidence which would support a finding
that the amount involved was less than $100, there was no error in
this was especially
refusing to charge on a lesser included offense;
41
true since the request was not in writing.

B. Order of Proof
The order of proof is within the trial judge's discretion. Ordinarily
he should not admit evidence of defendant's confession in a criminal
trial until evidence of the corpus delicti of the offense charged has
been received. It is no abuse of discretion if, after the receipt of the
confession, the necessary evidence is received. The error if any was
thereby cured and rendered harmless.42 The judge may permit the
state in rebuttal to repeat testimony or evidence received in its main
43
case.
The trial judge had sequestered the witnesses in a criminal prosecution because they had been interviewed by the prosecutor; at the
close of the state's case defendant's motion for a directed verdict had
been denied; defendant then took the stand and on cross-examination
conceded that he had made a written statement concerning an important matter. In rebuttal the state was permitted to call a sequestered witness. On appeal the supreme court made it clear that a
witness is not rendered incompetent by sequestration or by a violation
of the sequestering order. The trial judge has discretion in dealing
with such a situation.44
C. Witnesses
1. Judge's Discretion To Hear.-It is not error for the trial judge to
permit a witness to be cross-examined concerning his past marital condition or prior disgraceful conduct. It is within the court's discretion
of a witness statements
to permit the jury to hear on cross examination
45
of the facts of his personal history.
In a proceeding to condemn a specified parcel of land, a qualified
expert witness testified as to his opinion based on his experience as
to its value. It is no abuse of discretion for the trial judge' to refuse
to hear evidence from him as to the sale price of one parcel of
similarly situated property. The court pointed out that the evidence
41. Reynolds v. State, 358 S.W.2d 320 (Tenn. 1962).
42. Miller v. State, 358 S.W.2d 324 (Tenn. 1962).

43. Hardin v. State, 355 S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1962).
44. Nance v. State, 358 S.W.2d 327 (Tenn. 1962).

45. Cooper v. State, 356 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1962).
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is relevant, but it is better practice to leave this sort of evidence to
cross-examination.4
D. Verdict
1. Directed Verdict.-Where the record shows that the judge should
have directed a verdict for the defendant, misconduct of the jury in
reaching that verdict is harmless to the losing party.47
2. Special Verdict.-The court is under no obligation to submit a
special verdict to the jury or to clarify instructions which are deemed
to be ambiguous or capable of being misunderstood unless requested
to do so.48 And in reviewing the evidence in such a case the court
of appeals applied the accepted rule-"take the strongest legitimate
view of all the evidence in favor of the prevailing party, disregard
contrary evidence and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor
of the verdict."49
In an instructive opinion dealing with the use of special verdicts
and answers to special questions, the supreme court first determined
that plaintiff in an action for personal injuries had a right to have
submitted to the jury all issues of fact made by the pleadings and
the evidence. After much evidence had been received, the trial
judge selected one of the several issues made by the evidence and
framed a question to be answered upon that issue. He submitted
that question to the jury with an instruction that if they answered it
in the negative, it would dispose of the whole case. Under the evidence an answer either way would have been supportable and only
the negative would have disposed of the whole case. The jury returned a negative answer. On appeal from the judgment the supreme
court reversed. The use of the device of special verdicts is not within
the uncontrolled discretion of the judge, and the judge's action was a
clear inducement to the jury to return a negative answer. 50
VII.

JUDGMENT

A. Res Adjudicata-Splitting

Plaintiff in December 1959 brought action against defendants
alleging that they had damaged his property by casting foul vapors
upon his premises during the period October 1, 1957 to October 1,
1959. By amendment he specified damages in the period October 1,
46. State ex rel. Moulton v. Blake, 357 S.W.2d 836 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
47. Dan v. Bryan, 354 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
48. Rush v. Lick Creek Watershed Dist., 359 S.W.2d 582 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).

49. Ibid.

50. Harbison v. Briggs Bros. Paint Mfg. Co., 209 Tenn. 534, 354 S.W.2d 464 (1962).

19631

PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE

1957, to October 1, 1958, only; he recovered judgment on the amended
complaint and received satisfaction by payment in full. To a new
action seeking to recover for the period October 1, 1958, to October 1,
1959, the court ruled that this judgment was a bar to claims to all
damages accruing prior to the commencement of the action of December 1, 1959. He is not permitted thus to split what the court
regards as a single action for a continuing wrong.51 He may recover
in later actions for damages done after December 1, 1959. It has been
persuasively argued by Professor Cleary of Illinois that this results in
a windfall to the defendant, and that the bar should be lifted if
plaintiff first pays to the defendant all expenses incurred by him that
are caused by plaintiff's failure to include his whole claim in one action.52
In a workmen's compensation proceeding it appeared that the applicable statutory period of limitations had expired before commencement of the proceedings. The claimant's contention was that the
representative of the liability insurance company carrying the risk,
in negotiating with the injured employee, had induced him not to
bring action within the statutory period. The trial judge heard evidence upon the issue made by the company's denial, found that the
representative had so induced plaintiff and proceeded to award
compensation. The supreme court on appeal held the judge's finding
conclusive because supported by substantial evidence and estopped
the insurance company from relying upon the defense that the action
was barred by expiration of the statutory period.5 3 Where the claimant's action was dismissed on a jurisdictional ground or on other
grounds than on the merits, the judgment of dismissal is not a bar
to a later action for the same injury. In such circumstances under
the applicable Tennessee statute, the later action may be brought
within one year from the time of entry of the judgment of dismissal.54
This offers a measure of protection to the injured workman against
the carelessness or ignorance of counsel, but it also furnishes an opportunity for abuse.
The Tennessee Senate acting in an impeachment proceedinghearing testimony and considering evidence as to conduct of the
respondent-exercised judicial power. Its findings and judgment were
conclusive and entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of Ten55
nessee.
In an earlier action the state had sought to compel the Quarterly
51. Henegar v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 209 Tenn. 355, 354 S.W.2d
69 (1962).
52. Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948).
53. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Baxter, 357 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn. 1962).
54. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Kirkland, 356 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn. 1962).
55. Scboolfield v. Tennessee Bar Ass'n, 209 Tenn. 304, 353 S.W.2d 401 (1961).
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County Court to issue school bonds, and the resulting trial jury found
that the court had not proceeded under Tennessee Code Annotated
section 49-201. In a later action by a number of taxpayers to enjoin
the sale of the school bonds, the county demurred. The trial court
sustained the demurrer. The supreme court affirmed and held that
the decree in the earlier action did not require that it be recognized
as binding in this action either as res adjudicata or as an application
of the doctrine of stare
decisis. The error assigned relied on the
56
application of the latter.
The real estate agent who was principal on the required statutory
bond was acquitted of the offense of fraudulent breach of trust in a
specified transaction. The decision on appeal as interpreted by the
chancellor in a later action against the sureties on the bond was that
the money involved in that transaction belonged to the defendant
since he had earned it as compensation. The supreme court held that
this dictum had no application in the case
against the sureties either
as res adjudicata or as the law of the case. 57
B. Nonsuit

1. Will Contest.-In a will contest a contestant may not take a
nonsuit without prejudice, and if he purports to take such a nonsuit,
the court will proceed, take evidence and make its findings on the
merits. Its decree will be res adjudicata
in any further proceedings to
58
it.
contest
to
or
will
same
the
propound
2. Eminent Domain.-Under the statute59 applicable to eminent
domain proceedings, where the county had done no more than file its
petition and move for a jury of view, it was entitled to have its
motion for nonsuit granted.6"
C. Dismissal

Where an insuror against liability settles and compromises an action
brought against the insured for personal injuries and causes judgment
of dismissal to be entered, the judgment is no bar to the injured's
claim against the insured, unless he participated in the settlement.
In the case at bar a pertinent statute 61 required express consent in
writing after the cause of action arose.6
56. Miller v. Warren County, 209 Tenn. 457, 354 S.W.2d 433 (1962).
57. Clements v. Pearson, 209 Tenn. 223, 352 S.W.2d 236 (1961).
58. Arnold v. Marcom, 352 S.W.2d 936 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1961).
59.

TENN. CODE ANN. §§

20-1311, -1313 (1956).

60. Williams v. McMinn County, 209 Tenn. 236, 352 S.W.2d 430 (1961).
61. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3001 (1956).
62. City of Chattanooga v. Ballew, 354 S.W.2d 806 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).

19631

PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE

VIII. APPEAL AND ERROR
A. What Is Appealable
A verdict is not the equivalent of a final finding-it is not appealable.
It is merely an interlocutory finding and cannot be pleaded as res
adjudicata on the issue of fact which it answers or resolves.0
B. PreliminaryRequisites
The court of appeals may waive compliance with its own rules as
to any matters of form with reference to the filing of papers required
to perfect the appeal, provided that the record shows compliance in
matters of substance. 64 But where the certificate of approval of the
bill of exceptions to the order of the judge overruling the motion for
a new trial bore no date, and there was no showing that it was made
before the bill was filed, the bill of exceptions will be stricken on
motion.6 And in a civil action where the bill failed to show that it
included all of the evidence, an assignment of error that the verdict
was not sustained by the evidence was disregarded, as were assignments concerning admitting or rejecting specified testimony.6 In this
connection it must be borne in mind that an assertion of fact set forth
in the bill of exceptions as a ground of a motion is not the equivalent
of a statement that the fact exists or existed. It is like an allegation
in a pleading, and is not the basis of an assignment of error.7
C. DiscretionaryAppeal
The chancellor may properly allow a discretionary appeal from an
order dismissing an action to quiet title to a portion of a parcel of
land condemned on behalf of the state for the purpose of constructing
a bridge. The motion in the instant case had been made by the
defendant commissioner of highways on the ground that the action
was in essence an unauthorized action against the state. The supreme
court agreed, and the order dismissing the action as to the commis68
sioner was upheld.
D. Assignment of Error
1. Failure To Comply with Rules.-If an appellant fails to comply
with a rule as to stating his assignment of error but in another portion
63.
64.
65.
66.

Neely v. State, 356 S.W.2d 401 (Tenn. 1962).
F. Perlman & Co. v. Gillian, 49 Tenn. App. 486, 355 S.W.2d 638 (W.S. 1961).
Pennington v. General Motors Corp., 354 S.W.2d 479 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1961).
National Shirt Shop v. City of Nashville, 354 S.W.2d 264 (Tenn. App. M.S.

1961).
67. Dupes v. State, 209 Tenn. 506, 354 S.W.2d 453 (1962).
68. A. L. Kornman Co. v. Moulton, 360 S.W.2d 30 (Tenn. 1962).
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of his brief sets out what should have been in the required statement,
the court will consider the substance of the assignment. The brief
made it clear that the assignment presented the question whether the
alleged conduct of the defendant liability insurance company in the
instant litigation amounted to bad faith so as to impose upon the
defendant responsibility for a loss beyond the limits of its policy.69
Where appellant's failure to file his assignments of error and brief
within the prescribed time was due to a mistake in addressing mail
containing them and the resulting delay of three days caused no
harm or injustice to the opponent, the court will not dismiss the
appeal.70
E. What Constitutes a FinalDecree

Complainant sought injunctive relief against interference by defendant with collection of rents under a lease for a term of three years
and secured a temporary injunction. Defendant's motion to dissolve
the injunction was overruled and he appealed. The appellate court
held that the overruling order was appealable as a final decree; the
fact that the lease expired before decision on the appeal could be
made did not render the case moot because of other proceedings in
the case which concerned the final disposition of money that had
been paid into the registry of the court.7 '
F. Cross-claims-Basisfor Appeal

Where a party files a cross bill in which he has alleged that he had
furnished the consideration for the conveyance to his wife and that
she held the property conveyed as a resulting trustee for him, and the
chancellor has found that title was taken in the wife's name for the
purpose of defrauding cross-complainant's creditors so that no resulting trust arose, the cross complainant
on appeal cannot base his cross
72
claim on any other theory.
G. Scope of Review

It is the accepted rule that the concurrent findings of the master and
chancellor are conclusive in the court of appeals if supported by substantial evidence. 3 Findings of fact by a jury in a law action or by
a jury in equity when approved by the chancellor are conclusive in
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Perry v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 359 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
Trimble v. Holley, 358 S.W.2d 343 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962).
Wooldridge v. Robinson, 352 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
Conner v. Holbert, 354 S.W.2d 809 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
Oman Const. Co. v. City of Nashville, 353 S.W.2d 97 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1961).
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the court of appeals if there is any competent substantial evidence in
the record to support them. 74 And the fact that the testimony of some
witnesses presented by the prevailing party was to the contrary is not
controlling in the action at law. But a mere scintilla is not sufficient.
In applying this test in equity the court reviewed at great length the
evidence received at the trial of a bill to set aside a conveyance of
a parcel of land to a church by plaintiff's sister. The only question
submitted to the jury was: "Was Magdalena S. Febn senile, feebleminded, incompetent or unduly influenced at the time of the execution
of the deeds to defendant September 1, 1953"? The answer was
"Yes." 75 The court held that this and other findings were not supported by competent, substantial and convincing evidence such as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a finding.7 6 It
is settled that in a suit of this kind, a finding may not be based upon
a "mere preponderance" of the evidence, but how can the result of
the application of the test in one case be used to determine the
result which should be reached in another where oral testimony is
received? Does the publication of opinions of this character serve
any purpose except to appease the losing litigant or his attorney?
In an election contest the supreme court will affirm the decision of
the trial court unless the record shows that the proponderance of the
evidence is to the contrary. This is often stated in terms of presumptions although it is dealing with the burden of persuasion. The
election officials are presumed to know the law and to have acted in
compliance with it.7 7 Furthermore, a person who holds office under
a certified election return is ineligible to challenge the validity of that
election even though he claims that certain ballots were excluded
on account of duress exercised on the election officials.
When the record indicated that more satisfactory evidence is
available on the issues tried and if produced will enable the court to
reach a more satisfactory result, the court remanded the cause for the
reception of such evidence. 9 And where the record reveals that the
issue, whether the driver of a truck involved in an accident was an
employee of the owner of the truck or of the lessee, was tried and
the verdict was supported by competent and substantial evidence, the
court of appeals will affirm in the absence of a showing of error
0
affecting the verdict by the trial judge.Y
74. City of Chattanooga v. Ballew, 354 S.W.2d 806 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
75. Schlickling v. Georgia Conference Ass'n Seventh-Day Adventists, 49 Tenn. App.
412, 420, 355 S.W.2d 469, 473 (W.S. 1961).
76. Id. at 480-82, 355 S.W.2d at 498-500.
77. Dixon v. McClary, 209 Tenn. 81, 349 S.W.2d 140 (1961).
78. Ibid.
79. Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 351 S.W.2d 411
(Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
80. F. Perlman & Co. v. Gillian, supra note 64.
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1. Trial de Novo.-On writ of error from the chancellor's dismissal
of suit, the court of appeals reversed and the supreme court granted
certiorari and reviewed the case de novo. The court assumed that the
decree of the chancellor was correct and his findings were given great
weight. In reviewing the record the court held that the evidence
fully supported the chancellor's findings and conclusions of fact, and
preponderated in favor of his decree, and remanded the case.81 But
on error from judgment of conviction for disturbing a religious assembly where the bill of exceptions was not filed on time, the court could
consider only errors appearing in the formal record, and on a rehearing, only matter open to consideration at the original hearing.8
Likewise in a workman's compensation case, the scope of inquiry
concerning the lower court's findings of fact is limited to whether
there is sufficient material evidence to support its finding. The
supreme court does not try the case de novo.8
2. Criminal Case-(a) Burden of Persuasion.-In a criminal case
where the defendant has been found guilty by the jury and the
verdict has been approved by the trial judge, the defendant on appeal
has the burden of showing that the verdict is against the weight of
the evidence. This is a concomitant of the Tennessee rule that the
trial judge is in essence a thirteenth juror.84
H. Dispositionon Appeal
Where an examination of the record shows that the creditors of
defendant husband in a divorce action had been enjoined from proceeding further in the circuit court, the circuit judge dismissed an
intervening petition. The petitioner excepted and appealed to the
supreme court. On motion to dismiss the appeal, the court examined
the record to determine whether the case was moot and found that
the issues had been fully determined, so that there was no place for
intervention and dismissed the appeal. 5
I. Jurisdictionof Court of Appeals
The court of appeals has no power to reinstate a verdict which the
trial judge has set aside for the reason that he did not approve the
86
result reached by the jury.
81. Folk v. Folk, 355 S.W.2d 634 (Tenn. 1962).
82. Ford v. State, 355 S.W.2d 102, rehearingdenied, 356 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn. 1962).
83. Huey Bros. Lumber Co. v. Kirk, 357 S.W.2d 50 (Tenn. 1962).
84. Staggs v. State, 357 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1962).
85. American Nate Bank & Trust Co. v. Hon, 360 S.W.2d 20 (Tenn. 1962).
86. McCulley v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 359 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn.. App. E.S. 1962) (four
companion cases).
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Complainants sought a decree that they were the owners of certain
land by valid conveyances from decedent and that decedent left no
estate of value. Respondent by cross-bill prayed judgment that these
conveyances were invalid. On writ of error granted by the clerk of
the supreme court, the court heard argument on the merits and on
respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal. The record showed that
the pleadings made several issues of fact which had not been resolved
in the proceedings in the trial court, and the supreme court ordered
the cause transferred to the court of appeals because only that court
had jurisdiction to entertain the cause. The supreme court was without power to determine either the merits or to dismiss the appeal. It
has jurisdiction only where the cause has been finally determined in
the lower court on demurrer or other method not involving a review or
87
determination of the facts.
IX.

UNITED STATES COURTS

The following cases of the United States District Court and of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, are of interest to
Tennessee lawyers.
A. DistrictCourt
1. Pleading-Amendment-Relation Back.-The original complaint
was by the United States for forfeitures and double damages under
the False Claims Act and for damages under the Commodity Credit
Corporation Act for obtaining unauthorized loans. The amendment
was filed after the prescribed statutory period had expired. The trial
court ruled that the amendment to the statement of claim for forfeiture related back to the commencement of the action. These
forfeitures were not penal so as to abate with the death of the wrongdoer. And the claim asserted in the amendment under the Commodity
Credit Corporation Act is not the same as that alleged in the complaint
under the False Claims Act. Hence the amendment is subject to the
defense that the prescribed statutory period had expired as to claims
not presented in the original complaint. The lapse of time between
the time when the action was begun and the filing of the amendment
(1952 to 1960) would make unavailable to defendant important
relevant evidence that he might otherwise have had, as is shown by
the death of the defendant. 8
2. Parties.-Inan action- for infringement of a patent the licensee is
87. Bales v. McPhetridge, 209 Tenn. 334, 354 S.W.2d 60 (1962). See
§ 16-408 (1956).
88. United States v. Templeton, 199 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Tenn. 1961).
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not an indispensable party if the record shows: (1) that his interest
is distinct and severable, and (2) the court can in his absence render
justice between the parties, and (3) the decree made in his absence
will have no injurious effect upon his interest, and (4) the final
determination, in his absence, will be consistent with equity and good
conscience. In the instant case Judge Robert Taylor found all four
conditions satisfied and held that the absent licensee was not an
indispensable or necessary party. 9
3. Jurisdiction-(a) State Statute Determining.-In determining
whether the United States district court has jurisdiction of the subject
matter or of the person of a litigant, the district court applies the rule
evolved by judicial decisions or prescribed rules of federal procedure.
Thus a Pennsylvania corporation which contracts to sell towers at a
cost of over $9,000 and to do the work of installation in Tennessee is
subject to substituted 90service as authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-923.
(b) Corporation Doing Business in State.-On a motion to quash
service of summons by defendant, a foreign corporation, the United
States district judge heard oral testimony which revealed that defendant was a sales organization for selling swimming pools. It
appointed dealers and distributors in Tennessee for subsequent sales,
but it never solicited a sale; the dealer or distributor had a so-called
franchise agreement in which he bound himself to sell and do other
relevant things, but as an independent salesman. The district judge
held that the activities of the corporation were sufficient to constitute
carrying on business in Tennessee by the test applied in decisions of
the United States courts.91 It seems obvious that what the district
judge meant was not that the federal decisions were applying the
"doing business" test but rather the "sufficient contacts" test.
4. Judgment.-In actions arising out of a collision of automobiles,
driver A and his passenger each brought a separate action against the
estate of motorist B. The actions were consolidated for trial and
verdicts therein rendered for defendant. Later the administrator of
B brought action in the United States district court against driver A,
M, the owner of the car A was driving, as owner and as master of
driver A, and two others both as owners and also as masters. In the
later action plaintiff moved as against these defendants for summary
judgment upon the issue of liability. The motion was denied. The
court held that in the previous verdict and judgment for defendant2
there was no necessary finding that plaintiff therein was negligent.1
89. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 200 F. Supp. 407 (E.D.
Tenn. 1961).
90. Shuler v. Wood, 198 F. Supp. 801 (E.D. Tenn. 1961).
91. Smith v. Lancer Pools Corp., 200 F. Supp. 199 (E.D. Tenn. 1961).
92. Thomas v. Fertick, 200 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
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B. Court of Appeals
1. Burden of Proof and Presumptions.-The plaintiff pleaded and
offered evidence on five separate specifications of negligence of
defendant in an airplane crash. Both parties agreed that the real issue
related to the speed of the plane. There was no error in refusing to
charge that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable. The
former decisions that the doctrine applies to all crashes of airplanes
in flight have been disapproved. Changed conditions and later ex3
perience have made the doctrine obsolescent if not obsoletef
The rule that the failure of a party to call an available witness is
the basis for an inference that evidence presented by the witness
would not further that party's case or would be unfavorable to him
has no application where the potential witness is (1) available to
both parties or (2) if called would naturally be favorable to one
party unless he has peculiar knowledge of the pertinent facts and
would present evidence which would do more than merely corroborate
the evidence of witnesses who have testified. 4
2. Motion for New Trial.-A mother and four children were injured
in a two-car collision. The father as plaintiff received an adverse
verdict. He alone was liable for the expenses incurred for medical care
and treatment. The damages were for pain and suffering only; none
of the injuries were permanent. The jury awarded separate damages
to each of the injured. The motion for a new trial was on the ground
that the amount awarded to each of the injured was inadequate. The
motion was denied. In affirming judgment on the verdicts, the court
of appeals said: "There is no measure by which the amount of
damages for pain and suffering can be ascertained. In reality, the
translating of pain and suffering into money is the result of conjecture
permitted by law."9 5 This is a frank statement of the truth which most
courts are unwilling to acknowledge formally.
3. Trial-Misconduct of furor.-After the jury had retired the trial
judge and counsel for defendant were informed that during the trial
one juror had given the other jurors certain information. Neither party
made any objection or motion for a mistrial, and the judge took no
action. On appeal from judgment on the verdict, the court of appeals
considered the information and held that of itself it was of sufficient
importance to make the conduct of the juror cause for reversal, but
held that the failure of counsel to request any action by the trial judge
made this irregularity no ground for reversal. 96
4. Jurisdiction-Identityof Corporation.-DefendantB corporation,
93.
94.
95.
96.

Gafford v. Trans-Texas Airways, 299 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1962).
Ibid.
Cross v. Thompson, 298 F.2d 186, 187 (6th Cir. 1962).
Keymon v. Tennessee Towing Co., 296 F.2d 785 (6th Cir. 1961).
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sued as a Texas corporation, was summoned by service upon A as
manager. A appeared for the B corporation, incorporated in Tennessee, and by affidavit alleged that the B corporation was incorporated
in Tennessee and that he (A) had no relationship at all with the B
corporation of Texas. The district judge dismissed the action. The
court of appeals held: (1) the appearance of the Tennessee corporation by A was totally unauthorized, and (2) affidavits by A raised an
issue as to the identity of the defendant sued and that issue was
to be tried. Hence it was error to dismiss the action.97
The crucial issue in a prosecution for unlawful possession of intoxicants was the identity of the driver of the car transporting them.
Counsel on both sides stated that such was the fact. They did not
question the fact that the contents of the car were cartons containing
the intoxicants in bottles and that they were non-tax paid; both
counsel and the trial judge so stated. The judge charged that if the
jury found that defendant was the driver of the car, they should find
him guilty. He did not submit the question whether the contents were
non-tax paid or whether they were intoxicants. The judgment of
conviction was reversed and the cause remanded. Citing Rule 52(b),
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the appellate court stated: "It was
necessary . . . that the Government prove ... that the circumstances
were such as to constitute possession by appellant of the contents of
the cardboard carton and that the carton contained nontaxpaid
whiskey.... No matter how conclusive the evidence may be... the
trial judge cannot make the finding or withdraw the issue from the

jury."98

5. Appeal and Error-Amendment To Admit Evidence.-The trial
judge committed reversible error in refusing to receive evidence of a
witness that he heard the crash of a collision between an automobile
and the train at a crossing but did not hear any bells or whistle. It
was for the jury to determine whether he would have heard had the
whistle been blown or the bell rung. The court should have permitted
an amendment making evidence admissible although plaintiff had
been negligent in failing to discover it.99 This is another instance of
the court's great liberality in insisting that amendments be permitted
which would make admissible potential evidence sufficient to prevent
a directed verdict. It certainly encourages careless work by counsel.
97. Castleman v. Alamo Plaza, Inc., 296 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1961).
98. United States v. McKenzie, 301 F.2d 880, 882 (6th Cir. 1962).
99. Green v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 299 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1962).

